Marinwood Parks and Rec discusses Wildfire Tax/JPA

Forest thinning projects won’t stop the worst wildfires. So why is California spending millions on them?

Forest thinning projects won’t stop the worst wildfires. So why is California spending millions on them?

Four months after the town of Paradise was incinerated in the most destructive wildfire in California history, Gov. Gavin Newsom issued an emergency proclamation, ordering agencies to thin trees and clear shrubs near some of the state’s most fire-threatened communities.

Saying the $32 million in projects were vital “to protect the lives and property of Californians” he swept aside environmental reviews and competitive bidding requirements to speed the work.

But the state’s recent fire chronicles are riddled with examples of how such fuel break projects don’t guard against the wind-driven infernos that have laid waste to communities the length of California.

Consider the case of Paradise. Officials there spent years doing exactly what Cal Fire contractors have been doing this summer — thinning vegetation along roads and near development where firefighters can take a stand.

It didn’t work. The wind-whipped Camp fire hurtled over the fuel breaks and destroyed the town, killing 86 people and burning nearly 19,000 homes, businesses and other structures.

Chopping down trees and shrubs is “an easy approach because people think ‘Oh, the thing we can change is vegetation’ … and people want the problem to be fixed,” research scientist Alexandra Syphard said. “But unfortunately, it’s more complex than that.”

Syphard — who conducted one of the few scientific assessments of the effectiveness of fuel breaks in California — worries that the state’s focus on fuel reduction gives “people a false sense of security.”

“Time and time again in my research,” she said, “I find that fuel is one of the least important factors when it comes to protecting the home.”

To stem the escalating loss of life and property, Syphard and other experts argue the state needs to curb development in high fire-hazard zones, help homeowners ember-proof their houses and do a better job of enforcing defensible space regulations.

The hot, dry winds that howl down California mountainsides every year go by different names: Santa Anas in much of the Southland, sundowners in Santa Barbara, Diablos in the Bay Area.

They are a function of the state’s dramatic topography. And they are unstoppable — the predictable protagonists in California’s lengthening narrative of wildfire catastrophes.

The state’s 10 most destructive wildfires on record have all been wind driven. They have destroyed a total of 39,440 structures and claimed 170 lives. Seven of the 10 have occurred since 2015, including the Tubbs fire in Northern California’s wine country, and the Thomas and Woolsey fires in Southern California.

Paradise officials knew they were in dangerous wildfire country. The Sierra Nevada foothill community sits on a windy ridge amid pine and oak trees, grass and shrubs that have burned before and would inevitably burn again.

So beginning in 2001, they obtained roughly $2 million in mostly state and federal grants to remove underbrush and young trees on the edge of town and nearby communities. The 100-foot wide strips were partially thinned, creating miles of what are called shaded fuel breaks — the same approach Cal Fire is using in many of this year’s projects.

But when the Camp fire broke out the morning of Nov. 8, winds rocketing out of the Jarbo Gap launched firebrands and glowing embers over the fuel breaks as if they didn’t exist.

“It jumped over anything that we had done by a long range” said Jim Broshears, the former Paradise fire chief who oversaw some of the fuel reduction projects. “By the time the main fire hit Paradise, we had fire all over the place from spot fires.”

One, he noted, started “at least five miles from the front of the fire” and burned backward into town.

In the deadly Tubbs fire, Santa Rosa’s Coffey Park neighborhood was set ablaze by blowing embers that soared over the 101 Freeway, a de facto fire break. The Thomas fire — the state’s second largest wildfire on record — burned over a number of fuel breaks around Ojai, including one that runs atop a mountain ridge for 13 miles.

Santa Ana winds sent embers flying over a river and a reservoir in the massive 2003 Cedar fire, which left 15 dead in San Diego County. Four years later, fierce Santa Anas drove the Witch fire over some of the same scrublands, tossing firebrands over Interstate 15.

Cal Fire director Thom Porter nonetheless defends the state’s fuel break projects, saying they can be helpful even in wind-driven fires. He pointed to thinning that reduced the Camp fire’s intensity as it burned along the lower portion of Skyway, Paradise’s main evacuation route.

“It did save lives,” Porter said.

The fast-moving front of a fire that spews embers across the landscape is just one part of a blaze, he added. When a fire’s flanks and heel hit a fuel break, they will slow — “and that is why we continue to do them,” Porter said. “They help us get people out of the way.”

Local and state agencies have been cutting fuel breaks across California’s chaparral and forest landscapes for more than half a century.

They take different forms and sizes, but generally consist of a strip of wild land where the vegetation has been completely or partly removed. They are not designed to stop wildfires on their own, but to give firefighters a place to establish control lines and set backfires.

The breaks can be effective under the right conditions: If high winds aren’t spitting red-hot embers over them like a fire-breathing dragon, if fire behavior isn’t extreme and firefighting crews can get to them.

But by their very nature, catastrophic wildfires rarely obey those strictures.

“Why don’t you address the fires that are killing all the people?” said Richard Halsey, director of the nonprofit California Chaparral Institute and a fuel break critic. “Would you tell me how any of [the thinning projects] would have saved Coffey Park?”

The state, he says, is focusing on the wrong thing.

Use the money to retrofit houses with fire-resistant features, such as ember-proof vents, and “you would save more structures than any fuel treatments,” Halsey says.

There has long been controversy over the usefulness of fuel breaks and their effect on the landscape. Their snaking lines have scarred mountainsides, destroyed wildlife habitat and are fertile ground for invasive grasses that ignite more easily than the shrubs or trees they replace.

They need to be maintained but often aren’t. There is no guarantee that a wildfire will ever burn near them. Most of the evidence of their effectiveness is anecdotal and based on firefighters’ accounts.

In a research paper published in 2011, Syphard and her co-authors analyzed 30 years of data on fuel breaks and wildfires in Southern California’s four national forests.

Many of the fires never hit a fuel break. When they did, the percentage that stopped ranged from 22% on the San Barnardino forest to 47% on the Cleveland forest. In every instance that a break halted a fire’s progress, Syphard found it was because firefighters were on it.

“The only reason a fire ever stops at a fuel break, regardless of the weather conditions, is that a firefighter is there, using the fuel break to fight the fire,” said Syphard, who is affiliated with the Conversation Biology Institute and is chief scientist at Sage Underwriters, a homeowners insurance company.

It is typically too dangerous or logistically impossible to station crews on breaks in wind-whipped fires, which during peak runs can race across several hundred acres a minute.

A few miles north of Ojai, the Nordhoff fuel break zigzags along a prominent ridgetop in the fire-prone Los Padres National Forest.

Part of a decades-old network of breaks established to protect the town that sits in a picturesque bowl on the forest’s southern boundary, the Nordhoff was widened in 2009.

Crews used heavy equipment to clear a 13-mile-long, roughly 300-foot-wide strip that was easily visible in Google Earth photos — a twisting band of brown amid the rich green of the forest’s robe of chaparral.

In environmental documents, the U.S. Forest Service said improving Nordhoff and other breaks would lessen the wildfire threat to the Ojai Valley and also help prevent fires from burning deeper into the Los Padres, destroying sensitive wildlife habitat.

That’s not the way it worked in late 2017. The evening of Dec. 4, powerful Santa Ana winds snapped power lines in the Ventura County hills north of Santa Paula, igniting the explosive Thomas fire.

In the first 24 hours, the Thomas blasted across 86 square miles, unimpeded by several controlled burns that Ventura County had previously conducted near the city of Ventura. The town lost several hundred homes.

“Nothing was slowing that thing down” said John McNeil, assistant chief of the Ventura County Fire Department.

John Smith, a Los Padres forest district ranger, spent the first night of the Thomas in the burning hills, checking on fire crews. He watched as a sheet of wind-flattened flames “just reached out across” the two paved lanes of Highway 150, “picked up on the other side and kept going.”

At one point he drove off a dirt road to a spot that felt safe enough to use his radio. It was bare earth flanked by trees and an orchard. When he returned later that night, the trees were gone and a fence was in flames. The fire “had leaned across and burned across bare ground.”

By day three, a branch of the Thomas hit parts of the Nordhoff break — and ran right over it.

Post-fire images from Google Earth show the Nordhoff ridge embedded in an ashen landscape extending several miles north into the Rose Valley, where the fire licked the edges of a gun club and scattered private inholdings.

“Everything we see was burned in the Thomas Fire,” Bryant Baker, conservation director of the nonprofit Los Padres ForestWatch, said as he walked along the ridge this spring.

The winter’s rains had washed away ashes and sprinkled the slopes with the fresh green of new growth sprouting beneath the charred limbs of chaparral.

Initially, firefighters didn’t even try to use the Nordhoff. They were too busy defending homes in Ventura and Ojai and frantically knocking on doors, telling residents to get out.

A few days later, incident commanders sent bulldozers to another portion of the break to clear space for engine crews to set backfires.

“It didn't happen because the forecasted weather was so extreme,” and the winds were carrying spot fires more than a half mile from the flame front, McNeil said. "We never did get engines up there."

Several other fuel breaks to the west of Ojai, near Lake Casitas, also proved ineffective in the face of long-range spotting. "We weren’t able to contain the fires at any of those,” he said.

Firefighters had more luck at another break, called the Shelf, that hugs the northern edge of Ojai. There they were able to station engines and set backfires that steered the flames away from neighborhoods.

But when asked what saved the town where he has lived most of his 53 years, McNeil doesn’t point to the miles of fuel breaks that embrace the Ojai Valley. He cites the roughly 200 fire trucks that descended on Ojai, as well as a favorable wind alignment that blew arms of the Thomas fire to the north and south of town, rather than into it.

About a year later, Santa Ana winds pushed the Woolsey fire — the most destructive wildfire in Los Angeles County history — over eight lanes of the 101 Freeway. As it rushed to the sea, it inevitably burned over old fuel breaks in the Santa Monica Mountains, said John Todd, deputy chief for prevention in the county fire department.

Todd, like other fire officials, says fuel breaks can be useful in battling wildfires under certain conditions. But the county — where 10 million people live amid one of the earth’s most flammable landscapes — has stopped clearing big strips of chaparral from its rugged mountainsides.

Of the 35 fuel reduction projects that Newsom greenlighted this year, only one is in L.A. County — a 25-acre break next to homes on Big Rock Mesa in Malibu. And the county decided not to exempt it from environmental reviews, as Newsom’s emergency order allows.

"Going back to the '60s and '70s, L.A. County maintained a very extensive network of fuel breaks that covered ridge lines,” Todd said. “Our goal used to be, the more vegetation clearance the better.”

At one point the county employed a brush crusher — a large, toothed roller that crews attached to cables and lowered down hillsides. When the smashed shrubs dried out, they were burned.

But the back country breaks, often the width of 10 bulldozer blades, or 120 feet, “were frankly causing tremendous damage to the resources, tremendous erosion and habitat loss," Todd said. What’s more, no one could be sure they were in the right places to ever be used.

There is more bang for the buck, he said, in making houses resistant to the glowing ember blizzards that set buildings ablaze in firestorms.

"Vegetation clearance is an expensive proposition and it needs to be addressed often times on an annual basis,” he said. "You can change a vent and protect an attic space for 30 years instead of clearing miles of weeds [every summer]."

But home hardening is not the state’s current priority. Vegetation management is. The $32 million earmarked for the Cal Fire projects is part of $1 billion — primarily from the proceeds of California’s cap-and-trade greenhouse gas program — which the state plans to mostly spend on fuel reduction projects over the next five years.

Meanwhile, the Legislature this year stripped the funding from a proposal to establish a $1 billion low-interest loan and rebate program that would help homeowners pay for fire-resistant retrofits.

Porter, the Cal Fire director, said state agencies are committed to finding programs that would help disadvantaged communities make residences more fire resistant — but most homeowners can undertake the work on their own.

"In California every acre that can burn, will burn someday — and we all need to recognize that," he said.

Calli-Jane DeAnda, executive director of the Butte County Fire Safe Council, which coordinated much of the Paradise fuel break work, said both thinning and home hardening deserve funding.

During the Camp fire, "it wasn’t the flames of the wildfire approaching” that ignited the urban firestorm that left much of Paradise in ruins, she said. “It was embers landing on homes and eaves and vents."

She tells of one family that had followed all the defensible space rules. "Their property was as clean as anybody could have asked for. They had been using herbicides and maintaining grass …Their home was good construction,” she said. But “as the fire started to pick up its pace, they saw embers get sucked into their vents and come into their attic — and the house was on fire.”

Post-conflagration photos of Paradise reveal row after row of houses reduced to heaps of ash, while nearby trees and vegetation stand green and largely untouched by flame. In the Camp fire, the primary fuel was houses, not vegetation.

Jack Cohen, a retired Forest Service research scientist who studied ignitions and wildfire spread, said he’s been asked to explain the “unusual pattern of destruction” in Paradise.

His response: “It’s not strange and unusual — it’s typical. Every investigation I’ve done comes up with that pattern."

"We do fuel breaks because the premise is we've got a wildfire containment problem” when in fact, Cohen argues, we have a home ignition problem.

Until firefighting agencies recognize that, he said, their efforts are doomed to “further failure at ever increasing cost.”

In the deadly Tubbs fire, Santa Rosa’s Coffey Park neighborhood was set ablaze by blowing embers that soared over the 101 Freeway, a de facto fire break. The Thomas fire — the state’s second largest wildfire on record — burned over a number of fuel breaks around Ojai, including one that runs atop a mountain ridge for 13 miles.

S anta Ana winds sent embers flying over a river and a reservoir in the massive 2003 Cedar fire, which left 15 dead in San Diego County. Four years later, fierce Santa Anas drove the Witch fire over some of the same scrublands, tossing firebrands over Interstate 15.

Cal Fire director Thom Porter nonetheless defends the state’s fuel break projects, saying they can be helpful even in wind-driven fires. He pointed to thinning that reduced the Camp fire’s intensity as it burned along the lower portion of Skyway, Paradise’s main evacuation route.

“It did save lives,” Porter said.

The fast-moving front of a fire that spews embers across the landscape is just one part of a blaze, he added. When a fire’s flanks and heel hit a fuel break, they will slow — “and that is why we continue to do them,” Porter said. “They help us get people out of the way.”

Local and state agencies have been cutting fuel breaks across California’s chaparral and forest landscapes for more than half a century.

They take different forms and sizes, but generally consist of a strip of wild land where the vegetation has been completely or partly removed. They are not designed to stop wildfires on their own, but to give firefighters a place to establish control lines and set backfires.

The breaks can be effective under the right conditions: If high winds aren’t spitting red-hot embers over them like a fire-breathing dragon, if fire behavior isn’t extreme and firefighting crews can get to them.

But by their very nature, catastrophic wildfires rarely obey those strictures.

“Why don’t you address the fires that are killing all the people?” said Richard Halsey, director of the nonprofit California Chaparral Institute and a fuel break critic. “Would you tell me how any of [the thinning projects] would have saved Coffey Park?”

The state, he says, is focusing on the wrong thing.

Use the money to retrofit houses with fire-resistant features, such as ember-proof vents, and “you would save more structures than any fuel treatments,” Halsey says.

There has long been controversy over the usefulness of fuel breaks and their effect on the landscape. Their snaking lines have scarred mountainsides, destroyed wildlife habitat and are fertile ground for invasive grasses that ignite more easily than the shrubs or trees they replace.

They need to be maintained but often aren’t. There is no guarantee that a wildfire will ever burn near them. Most of the evidence of their effectiveness is anecdotal and based on firefighters’ accounts.

In a research paper published in 2011, Syphard and her co-authors analyzed 30 years of data on fuel breaks and wildfires in Southern California’s four national forests.

Many of the fires never hit a fuel break. When they did, the percentage that stopped ranged from 22% on the San Barnardino forest to 47% on the Cleveland forest. In every instance that a break halted a fire’s progress, Syphard found it was because firefighters were on it.

“The only reason a fire ever stops at a fuel break, regardless of the weather conditions, is that a firefighter is there, using the fuel break to fight the fire,” said Syphard, who is affiliated with the Conversation Biology Institute and is chief scientist at Sage Underwriters, a homeowners insurance company.

It is typically too dangerous or logistically impossible to station crews on breaks in wind-whipped fires, which during peak runs can race across several hundred acres a minute.

A few miles north of Ojai, the Nordhoff fuel break zigzags along a prominent ridgetop in the fire-prone Los Padres National Forest.

Part of a decades-old network of breaks established to protect the town that sits in a picturesque bowl on the forest’s southern boundary, the Nordhoff was widened in 2009.

Crews used heavy equipment to clear a 13-mile-long, roughly 300-foot-wide strip that was easily visible in Google Earth photos — a twisting band of brown amid the rich green of the forest’s robe of chaparral.

In environmental documents, the U.S. Forest Service said improving Nordhoff and other breaks would lessen the wildfire threat to the Ojai Valley and also help prevent fires from burning deeper into the Los Padres, destroying sensitive wildlife habitat.

That’s not the way it worked in late 2017. The evening of Dec. 4, powerful Santa Ana winds snapped power lines in the Ventura County hills north of Santa Paula, igniting the explosive Thomas fire.

See article in the LA TIMES HERE

Before and After the Camp Fire in Magalia, CA

Here is my in-laws former house in Magalia, CA before and after the Camp Fire in November 2018.  They sold this house years ago and are safe.   We don't know the status of the current owners.  The pictures tell the story.

Recommendations for buying a ladder truck. (Why it is crazy to put a 60 foot structure out at Grady Ranch)

Editor's Note: Grady Ranch is FOUR and Half times the distance as depicted in this video.
WHEN SHOULD YOU PURCHASE AN AERIAL LADDER?


09/01/1995









WHEN SHOULD YOU PURCHASE AN AERIAL LADDER?


BY HARRY R. CARTER, Ph.D.


The question "Does my community need an aerial ladder?" is not an easy one to answer. While researching this topic as a municipal fire officer and fire protection consultant, I discovered a mechanism for arriving at a series of answers to this question but no all-encompassing rule that could be offered for every situation.


For many years, it was thought that the answer to this question had a firm basis in fact. We were governed by the old rule-of-thumb that said an aerial ladder was necessary when five or more buildings of three stories or more in height or their equivalent were within a fire protection jurisdiction.


A recent phone call inquiring as to the exact citation of that recommendation touched off an extensive search of my personal library. It had been quite a while since someone had asked me to cite the source of that rule.


I found the citation under Section 540 of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) Fire Suppression Rating Schedule. It specifically states, "[R]esponse areas with 5 buildings that are 3 stories or 35 feet or more in height, or [have] 5 buildings that have a Needed Fire Flow greater than 3,500 gpm, or any combination of these criteria, should have a ladder company."



Is this all one needs to know to justify the need for an aerial unit in a community? I then asked myself. What about the communities that want more than just code and rating schedule quotations? Are there other criteria that could be used to back up the ISO recommendations?


SEARCH FOR ADDITIONAL CRITERIA


My search for additional criteria began in the same location at which many of our current standards and recommendations began their lives: the old American Insurance Association (AIA) Bulletins. AIA Special Interest Bulletin #69, "Fire Department Apparatus, Ladder and Elevating Platforms," addressed the issue of the appropriate ratio of aerial ladders to pumpers. This was a complementary reference to those remarks in the rating schedule that spoke of the need for a basic structural fire response of two pumper companies and a ladder or service company. I then selected data that could help broaden the basic requirements.


Some interesting clues related to the thinking of the individuals who developed this document were detected by reading between the lines. Relating to building conditions in the years following the Civil War, the bulletin stated: "As the height of buildings increased, it became evident that ladders long enough to reach the upper floors could not be handled by hand alone."


This seemingly urban problem from the 1870s and 1880s led to the development of an elevating ladder attached to a horse-drawn turntable vehicle. Thus, the aerial ladder was born. Undoubtedly, the debate over which fire departments should have one began at that point.


Since the ISO grading schedule speaks to how a unit becomes a rated aerial company, its existence is therefore acknowledged. And its guidelines give us a starting point. Unfortunately, we are still left with the question of how to further justify such an acquisition.


JUSTIFYING AN ACQUISITION


Whether to purchase an aerial ladder seems to be a local decision based on local building conditions. However, we have seen that many communities that did not need an aerial ladder had one and other communities that desperately needed one could not get one. What then to do?


These concerns led me to additional research and the development of the rules, given below, for determining if the acquisition of an aerial ladder or elevating platform device is warranted.


An aerial device is recommended when a number of buildings within the jurisdiction appear to be beyond the reach of existing fire department ground ladders. This recommendation is not only based on ISO recommendations but is a basic common-sense concept. If a significant number of your buildings are beyond the reach of your ground ladders, you had better do something about it.


The number of buildings beyond the reach of ground ladders in itself is not an absolute criterion; its significance will vary from community to community. For example, consider two communities, each of which has 15 buildings beyond the reach of a standard 35-foot portable ladder. The first is a farming community, and all 15 structures are barns or silos. The other community contains a series of apartment buildings, each more than 35 feet in height and housing approximately 40 residents. We can make a distinction in this case and would give an aerial to the latter.


In determining the need for acquiring an aerial device, we are not going to ignore the recommendations in the National Fire Protection Association`s Fire Protection Handbook, 17th edition, which recommends the following response patterns:


High-hazard occupancies (schools, hospitals, nursing homes, high-rise buildings): at least four pumpers, two ladder trucks, and other specialized apparatus as may be identified or available for the hazard.


Medium-hazard occupancies (apartments, offices, mercantile and industrial occupancies not normally requiring extensive rescue or firefighting capabilities): at least three pumpers, one ladder truck, and other specialized apparatus as may be identified or available.


Low-hazard occupancies (one-, two-, or three-family dwellings and scattered businesses and industrial occupancies): at least two pumpers, one ladder truck, and other specialized apparatus as may be identified or available.


Rural operations (scattered dwellings, small businesses, and farm buildings): at least one pumper with a large water tank (500 gallons or more), one mobile water supply apparatus (1,000-gallon or larger tank), and other specialized apparatus as may be necessary to perform effective initial firefighting operations.


These are excellent recommendations. However, as we have said, in many in-stances, the listing of a requirement or recommendation does not satisfy the incessant questioning of a municipal government official. That is the reason we are looking for actual physical criteria that can be used to justify acquiring such an expensive piece of firefighting equipment.


RULES GOVERNING THE ACQUISITION OF AN AERIAL DEVICE


l. Consider acquiring an aerial device when the portable ground ladders in your community will not reach the upper windows or roofs of buildings in your community. This is a simple but easily overlooked way to justify your need.


2. If you need long ladders and do not have enough people to raise them, consider an aerial ladder or elevating platform device.


Given that it takes four to six firefighters to raise and place a long ground ladder, ask the next question: Do you have enough people to lay out the attack and supply hoselines and raise a long ground ladder? This fact is fairly easy to establish.


A review of existing records can tell you how many people in your community respond during the various time periods. In almost every one of my consulting assignments over the past 15 years, there has been a diminished staffing level during the 0700-1700 hours time frame. This condition is especially prevalent in small fire departments. If you do not have the people, you cannot raise the ground ladders.


3. If the terrain and topography in a community rule out using ground ladders, you must consider aerial devices. Topographical and landscaping oddities may prevent the firefighters from approaching from the two-story side of two-story structures, such as townhouses, to raise ground ladders. In addition, Queen Anne (Victorian) homes--although not common in every U.S. community--do not provide good access for roof operations. In these situations, an aerial device would be needed to make the necessary rescues or accomplish ventilation operations.


William E. Clark, in both editions of Firefighting Principles and Practices (Fire Engineering Books), refers to such problems of access, terrain, and topography. If you cannot reach the roofs and upper floor windows by means of a ground ladder, you must opt for the aerial.


OTHER OPTIONS


The citizens expect you to be able to reach them in times of emergency--regardless of structure height or other access difficulties. If your community needs an aerial device but has an insufficient workload to justify the expense of purchasing one or cannot afford to buy one, consider a mutual-aid or regional purchase agreement (all parties in need of the aerial device share in the cost and one department serves as the host agency). When contracting with another department, be sure to work out agreement details before the need for the device arises and develop a written contract establishing procedures for requesting and providing aid and the equipment/services (or money) that will be offered in return for use of the aerial.


By sharing an aerial device with neighboring departments under an automatic-aid agreement, a fire department can lower its ISO rating (and consequently insurance rates). Under the automatic-aid agreement, a department arranges in advance to have another department`s assets (equipment, personnel, or both) automatically respond to a call in the contacting department`s territory; no request must be made at the time of the emergency (as must be done in a mutual-aid arrangement). Fire departments can receive up to 90 percent of the full credit (points) they would have received under the ISO Fire Suppression Rating Schedule if they owned the equipment. The number of credits that can be earned depends on the alarm receipt/dispatch, fireground communications, and joint-training arrangements between the aiding and aided departments. (See "Fire Suppression Rating Schedule,"by Dale Perry, Fire Engineering, June 1995, page 10.)


* * *


If you have developed a tight package of justifications, have sold the proposal to the powers that be (if you are a municipal fire department), and have sold it to the citizens in your community and still have not been able to gain approval for the funding of the level of fire protection you consider to be adequate, keep the paperwork, for there is always next year. n


HARRY R. CARTER, Ph.D., is a battalion chief with the Newark (NJ) Fire Department, a past chief of the Adelphia (NJ) Fire Department, and a fire protection consultant based in Adelphia.

Will we need a new Fire Ladder Company to fight fires at Marinwood Village ? We will DEFINITELY need one for Grady Ranch at 60 feet tall

Ladder Trucks are recommended for fighting fires in buildings above 35 feet high.
 Marinwood Village is 46 feet high at the highest point according to Bridge Housing plans.  Grady Ranch is 60 feet tall.

Ladder trucks can save lives.  This 4 story apartment fire appears to be a total loss. Imagine the catastrophe awaiting a 6 story apartment building  filled with seniors and disabled citizens. It will be a slow response time with trucks arriving from Novato and San Rafael.  Grady Ranch is 4 1/2 miles from the 101 freeway.

No ladder trucks can be seen in this photo.

Ladder trucks cost millons to buy, maintain, house and operate.



Ladder trucks and trained ladder companies are an enormous expense to the community.

New ladder trucks over a million dollars and they require additional trained fire staff to operate safely.  Marinwood Fire Department will be required to build a new fire station to house the equipment and the additional personnel. 

Our 11 man Marinwood Fire department budget consumes well over half of our 4.2 million dollar annual budget. Marinwood/Lucas Valley/ CSA 13 taxpayers pay some of the highest parcel taxes for fire service in all of Marin

Clearly more high density housing will cost this community dearly and new taxes will be needed for this expansion.  The Marinwood Village low income development will pay little taxes for their 82 units of family housing. According to Brad Wilban, Bridge Housing VP it will be approximately $142 per housing unit or $10,000 per year.  Many of us pay close  $10,000 for ONE HOUSE!!

A financial analysis of our Firefighting readiness and a financial analysis of costs are needed before considering the current Marinwood Village high density housing plans. 

If you question the wisdom of having a 3-4 story apartment building in our community without the fire safety equipment and trained personnel to keep our neighbors safe.  If you are upset that you will need to pay additional taxes to subsidize the Marinwood Village "big box" apartments,  please join "Save Marinwood"  to urge  sensible growth and wise land use.  Our County Supervisors must hear us.

Will residents living on the third floor of Marinwood Village be safe if the closest ladder trucks are miles away in other communities? How about the remote Grady Ranch with six stories?  


For more information see: When should you buy an aerial ladder

Veteran Firefighter asks "Who is going to respond to fires?"

In the 2008 Marinwood Village visioning session, veteran firefighter, Jim Juarez asks
the developer, "Who is going to fight the fires on the Marinwood Village complex when there are no aerial fire ladders in the community?"  The moderator gave the stock response, "We will write that question down and get an answer to you".   We are still waiting. 

Bridge Housing has no response yet either in 2013. 

.
For the complete presentation see: http://marin.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?publish_id=459

A City in Flames: Detroit-area firefighters battle Arson